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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
MARGARET McALLISTER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I 
-vs -
LAMAR BYBEE, CARVEL MATTSSON, 
Administrator of the Estate of O'Dell 
Watson, deceased, CALIFORNIA-PACIF-
IC UTILITIES COMP ANY, a corporation, 
aml KANAB CITY, UTAH, a municipal 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10726 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
KAN AB CITY, UTAH 
A Municipal Corporation 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
T h i s is an action to :r:ecover for damages allegedly 
sustained in Plaintiff's fall on a street or sidewalk in Kanab, 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court non-suited the Plaintiff under Rule 
.Jl (b) at the end of her case. (R.6). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Kanab City seeks affirmation of the dis-
missal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the reason that the trial court could not have found 
otherwise than that the Plaintiff not only failed to establish 
the cause of her fall but also conclusively proved her own 
contributory negligence, Respondent Kanab City submits 
that questions ,examining duty to remove obstructions, re-
sponsibility for the area of Plaintiff's fall, and determina-
tion of whether or not the conditions were negligently con-
trived or maintained are subjunctives with which this Court 
need not deal. 
The remaining fact statements of the Defendants and 
Respondents California-Paci.fie Utilities Company, LaMar 
Bybee, and Carv.el Mattsson, Administrator of the Estate 
of O'Dell Watson, deceased, accurately and comprehensively 
reflect the record and Respondent Kanab City c o n c u rs 
therein. 
To save time and space this Respondent will not r.epeat 
those statements of fact e x c e p t to summarize that the 
Plaintiff had traveled this way before and was familiar with 
the area and the conditions (Tr. 43, 50); she was not dis-
tracted (Tr. 50-52) or limited in vision or by visibility (Tr. 
43, 50) ; did not know what, if anything, she fell over (Tr. 
32, 55, 56, 57, and 58) but whatev.er it may have been it 
could have included rock, grass, or weeds (Tr. 56, Exhibit 
1) but her fall could have been - and most likely was -
attributable to her failure to step up over the curb (Tr. 46, 
47, Disposition P. 17). 
It is obvious that if any hazard existed, Plaintiff failed 
to prove she encountered it, but did prove she failed to see 
and avoid it. 
2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WHERE APPELLANT 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF HER INJURY. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT WAS EITHER CONTRIBUTOR-
ILY NEGLIGENT OR ASSUMED THE RISK OR BOTH, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL W HE R E APPELLANT 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF HER INJURY. 
The statement of Plaintiff is accurate where at Page 
10 of her brief she concedes: 
Ther.e is also no question that at the time of the 
fall, Plaintiff did not know what she fell over but 
made a determination at a later date as to the cause 
of her fall *** 
There is no foundation for the conclusions made in that 
later r.econstruction of the cause of Plaintiff's fall. 
Firnt, Plaintiff's testimony is that she did not know 
how many steps she had taken from the car (Tr. 56) nor 
does she know which foot may have struck an impediment 
(Tr. 56) although she claimed she was watching where she 
3 
was going (Tr. 50). Her deposition discloses that she did 
not know at that time whether or not she had negotia1erl 
the curb (Tr. 47, Deposition P. 17). 
No specific location of the vehicle laterally along the 
curb is fixed with such particularity as would dictate the 
Plaintiff's fall on or near any specific objects. 
The authorities cited by the other respondents all con-
clude in denial of liability where a determination of the 
cause is based upon conjecture or speculation. Tremelling 
vs. Southern Pacific Company, 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80 (sub-
s.equent opinion 70 Utah 72, 257 P. 1066) ; S um s ion vs. 
Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P2d 680; Devine vs. 
Cook, 3 U2d 134, 279 P2d 1073. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT EITHER WAS CONTRIBUTOR- ' 
IL Y NEGLIGENT OR ASSUMED THE RISK OR BOTH, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff knew of the cement blocks, (Tr. 50) having 
gone by them many times on her way to the bank (Tr. 48); 
there were no limitations on her vision or visibility (Tr. 43, 
50) and she was not distracted (Tr. 50-52). Whitman vs. 
W. T. Grant Co., 16 U2d 81, 395 P2d 918, holds that if a 
hazard is visible a person is charged to see and avoid it and 
as a matter of law 
* * * if he fails to do so, it is concluded that he was 
negligent either in failing to look, or in failing to 
heed what he saw * * * 
Where injury resulted from an observable hazard, the 
Whitman case holds that to present a jury question there 
must either be a distraction or a condition obscuring, or 
prev.enting Plaintiff from seeing, the danger. 
4 
The Plaintiff, knowing the condition by past experi-
ence, assumed any risk which might have existed. Ferguson 
vs. Jongsma 10 U2d 179, 350 P2d 404; Johnson vs. Maynard 
9 U2d 268, 342 P2d 884; Clay vs. Dunford 121 Utah 177, 
239 P2d 1075; Wold vs. Ogden City 123 U 270, 258 P2d 453. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed the action because 
the Plaintiff, as a matter of law, had no right to recover 
both for failure to establish the legal cause of any injuries 
and for her contributory neglig,ence and assumption of the 
risk. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
Kanab City, a Municipal 
Corporation 
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